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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Before Pollard specifically argues the points raised by Farmers in its brief, we ask the
Court to be especially mindful of certain matters of bedrock importance in this case, that Farmers
simply refuses to discuss. Examples of these are:
1. Farmers makes no attempt to reconcile the fact that it engrafts essentially family
type UM coverage, into its commercial liability policy, creating an ambiguity.
2. Farmers makes no attempt to quote, discuss or defend the specific terms of its UM
coverage, or to refute the arguments Pollard makes that the UM coverage terms
provide little if any UM coverage.
3. Farmers does not discuss, distinguish or attempt to tell this Court why the cases -
from other jurisdictions, cited by Pollard are not compelling precedent. Those
policies containing UM coverage of identical or similar terms as the policy here in
question, were deemed ambiguous and provided coverage for the corporate
owner.
The above deficiencies in Farmers brief will be discussed in more detail below.
ARGUMENT
The contentions put forth by Farmers may be summarized as follows:
1, That the policy is clear and unambiguous and does not provide UM coverage for
Pollard.
2. That the Utah UM Statute does not allow coverage for Pollards use of his
motorcycle.
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3. That the reasonable expectations concept is not applicable in this case.
POINT ONE
TFIE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
COMMERCIAL AUTO INSURANCE POLICY WAS
CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS. THE ISSUE IS
DE NOVO BEFORE THIS COURT.
In support of the conclusion that the policy is clear and unambiguous, Farmers cites the
definition of"auto" contained on page 9 of 11 pages in Appendix 3 (the Policy) attached to
Pollards brief. The definition reads:
"B. 'Auto' means a land motor vehicle, trailer or
semi-trailer designed for travel on public roads but
does not include 'mobile equipment'."
Farmers contends that a motorcycle clearly falls within that definition. That is not the
case. "Motorcycle" is not mentioned in the definition, 'Auto" is defined as a vehicle designed for
travel on public roads. It is true that motorcycles travel public roads but much of their attraction
is for off road use as recreational vehicles. Farmers then says that the case ofBearRiver Mutual
Insurance Company v. Wright, 770 P 2d 1019 (Ut. App. 1989), settled any definitional issues in
this case. The Court will note that Wright, did not deal with a definition of "auto", it dealt with
the question of whether a "motorcycle" is an "automobile". The Court held that cither an
"automobile" or "motorcycle'' might be considered a "motor vehicle". Nonetheless the case held
that a "motorcycle" is not an "automobile".
Applying Wright to our case we find that Farmers defines the word "auto" in its policy.
The word "auto" is merely a shorthand: way of saying automobile. The word "motorcycle" is not
used in Farmers policy.
Regardless of the construction of the definition, this is not a point in this case. As shown,
the grant of UM coverage does not require the insured, "you" or "family members" to be
occupying any "auto".
Farmers then argues that coverage is provided only for "covered autos" and that Pollard
would not be insured unless he was occupying one of the fourteen "covered autos" listed on the
policy.
This may be repetitious but to expand an argument above, there is no provision in the
"Business Auto Coverage Form" of the commercial policy that states, that an insured must be
occupying a listed "auto".
This is clear by reference to UM Coverage Form, which states:
"A COVERAGE
1, We will pay all sums the "insured" is legally entitled
to recover as compensatory damages from the owner or
driver a "uninsured motor vehicle"
B. WHO IS AN INSURED
1. You
2. If you are an individual, any "family member".
3. Anyone else "occupying" a covered "auto" or a
temporary substitute for a covered "auto"."
Under paragraph A above there is no requirement that an insured be occupying a covered
auto in order to claim UM coverage. Paragraph B, defines who is an insured, "You" are the two
corporations, namely Climate Source and Pollard Mechanical, Inc. We know that corporate
entities can never be damaged by an UninsuredMotorist. Further, corporations do not have
relatives. Paragraph three above does make a distinction. It provides that anyone else claiming
insurance must be "occupying" a covered "auto". As noted in Pollards initial brief however, the
fourteen listed "autos" are company "autos" and would be used on company business and
operated by employees. If they are injured by an uninsured motorist it would be likely that they
would be covered by workmen's compensation and there would be no UM coverage because it is
excluded.
"We will not pay for any element of"loss" if a person
is entitled to receive pay for the same element of "loss"
under any worker's compensation, disability benefits, or
similar law."
Farmers Policy states that it will provide UM coverage for an insured; but when it defines
insured; there isno one who can qualify. Thus, Farmers has provided no meaningful coverage .
under the UM section of the policy, even though it received a premium for that coverage. This is
a fundamental flaw in the policy, which creates an ambiguity that can be reconciled only by
resolving the issue against Farmers and in favor of Pollard, the corporate owner. This is the
conclusion drawn by all of the cases cited by Pollard in his initial brief.
Farmers has not addressed this issue, it does not discuss the UM terms in its brief, and it
makes no attempt to refute or distinguish the many cases of otherjurisdictions, that have
determined that the policy language, which is common to many commercial policies, is
ambiguous.
This isa situation where an insurance company has engrafted a basic family type UM
coverage onto a commercial liability policy. This is a matter of first impression in our courts.
There are no Utah cases on the subject. This Court should follow the precedent of other
jurisdictions and hold that the policy is ambiguous; that no meaningful UM coverage is provided;
and that the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of Pollard.
Farmers then turns to the Utah case of Clark v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.,
743 P.2d 1227 (Utah 1987). It cites that case for the proposition that an insured cannot buy one
policy of insurance and expect to have that policy cover all other autos the policyholder may own.
Farmers would have the Court hold that Pollard was attempting to transfer the Business Auto
Policy to his motorcycle, which coincidentally was also insured by Farmers,
Pollard is not attempting to transfer coverage from the Commercial policy to his
motorcycle or to stack coverage. The ruling he seeks is that he is entitled to coverage on one of
the fourteen commercial vehicles he insured. He is entitled to what Farmers contracted for under
Paragraph E, CHANGES IN CONDITIONS, of the UM coverage. It provides:
"If there is other applicable insurance available under one
or more policies or provisions of coverage:
a. The maximum recovery under all coverage under
all coverage forms or polices combined may equal
but not exceed the highest applicable limit for any
one vehicle under any coverage form or policy
providing coverage on either a primary or excess
basis "
We conclude this point by noting again that the language of the UM coverage is
ambiguous. Farmers does not quote or discuss the precise language of its UM coverage, nor does
it admit to the cases from other jurisdictions that have ruled on identical or similar terms holding
that the policy is ambiguous and that coverage would be granted to the corporate owner.
For an excellent dissertation on issues advanced by Pollard in this case, we commend to
the Court the Utah case ofUSF&G v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519 (Utah 1993), That case sets forth
with citations, a number of rules adopted by the Utah Court over many years for the construction
of insurance policy. One rule that has specific application to our case is, as follows:
"If an ambiguity arises, the rules of construction
outlined above must be employed to resolve the
ambiguity. An ambiguity in a contract may arise
(1) because of vague or ambiguous language in
a particular provision or (2) because two or more
contract provisions, when read together, give rise
to different or inconsistent meanings, even though
each provision is clear when read alone. The policy
in the instant case contains both types of ambiguity.
With respect to both types of ambiguity, the policy
must be construed in light of how the average,
reasonable purchaser of insurance would understand
the language of the policy as a whole."
"[T]he insured is entitled to the broadest protection
that he could reasonably believe the commonly
understood meaning of its terms afforded him."
It follows that the ambiguous or uncertain language
in an insurance contract that is fairly susceptible
to different interpretations should be construed in
favor of coverage. (Citations Omitted) It also
follows that if an insurance contract has inconsistent
provisions, one which can be construed against
coverage and one, which can be construed in favor
of coverage, the contract should be construed in
favor of coverage."
POINT TWO
UTAH'S UM STATUTORY SCFEME DOES NOT DENY BENEFITS
TO MR. POLLARD UNDER HIS COMMERCIAL POLICY.
Farmer's argument under this point concedes that Pollard is an insured under the
commercial auto insurance policy. However, Farmers argues further that even if the policy were
construed to provide UM coverage for Mr. Pollard the Utah UM Statute prohibits such coverage.
Pollard agrees that the statute does not grant coverage. Coverage can be determined only
by reference to the policy.
Nonetheless, Farmers reaches out to Subsection 7a of 31A-32-305, Uninsured and
Underinsured Motorist Coverage, and states that Pollard is prohibited from claiming UM
coverage under the policy, because he was not operating a listed vehicle.
Pollard has already shown to the Court in his initial brief, that Subsection 7a does not
include the operation of a motorcycle because motorcycle is not contemplated by the UM section
and the specific definition of"motor vehicle" contained in Subsection 4a of the UM statute,
specifically excludes motorcycle. Therefore 7a has no application to this case.
Even further Farmers can't legally reach out to a statue and use that as a basis to decline
coverage. Insurance law does not work that way. If Farmers desires to decline coverage it must
point to a provision in its policy which clearly takes away the coverage that would otherwise be
present.
Supporting Pollards argument that Farmers cannot reach to a statute to deny coverage is
the Utah case oiCullum v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 857 P.2d 922 (Utah 1993). In that
caseFarmers had a "step-down" in its policy that reduced coverage, which stated:
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"We will provide insurance for an insured person other
than you or a family member up to the limits of the
financial responsibility law only."
The Court held that an insurance company cannot reach out and incorporate by reference
a statutory provision that may limit coverage. This violates Section 31A-21-106 UCA. That
statute provides in substance that an insurance policy may not incorporate provisions by
reference. The statutory provision prohibits an insurance company from forcing an insured to
look elsewhere for information about the policy.
The principles ofCuilum are applicable to our case. If Farmers wanted to avoid coverage
in this case by relying on Subsection 7a (A) of 31 A-22-305, it should have put that subsection in
the policy in understandable language This it did not do. This is another reason why the statute
has no application in this case.1
POINT THREE
THE DOCTRINE OF REASONABLE EXPECTATION IS PRESENT IN
THIS CASE AND DOES PROVIDE UM COVERAGE TO MEL POLLARD
Relying upon the case of Wagiier v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. 786 P.2d 763, (Ut.
App. 1990), Farmers states that Pollard has not met the criteria of that case and therefore the
doctrine is not available to him in this case.
The criteria set forth in Wagner, are these:
1. Did Farmers know or should have known ofPollards expectation of UM coverage
for injuries to himself?
2. Did Farmers create or help to create Pollards expectation of coverage?
3. Was Pollards expectation of coverage reasonable?
Pollard filed an Affidavit in this case, Appendix Two attached to Pollards initial brief. (R.
30) The facts set forth in the Affidavit are uncontradicted. The Court will find the following:
Climate Source is a Utah Corporation organized in 1989. Pollard Mechanical, Inc., is a Utah
Corporation organized in 1994. Melvin Pollard is the owner of all of the issued and outstanding
stock of both corporations, and serves as President and Director of both companies. There are no
other officers or directors in either company. Both companies are in the business of installation
and repair of heating and air conditioning systems. Before incorporation Pollard operated the
business as a sole proprietor. For many years, both as a sole proprietor and later under corporate
form, Pollard purchased all business insurance including automobile insurance from Farmers
Insurance Group of Companies. All policies were renewed annually. Over the years Pollard
gained the knowledge from conversations with Farmers agents that he, personally, was insured
under the Business Owners policy coverage's, whether the vehicle he was operating was
described in the policy or whether it was not. Pollard believed and expected that he would be
fully covered for the injuries he received in the motorcycle accident of September 1997
Farmers created or helped to create that expectancy. Its agents over many years told
Pollard that he personallywas covered under the commercial liability policy including the "auto"
section.
1 The Farmers policy does contain an exclusion, under Section C of the UM coverage. Farmers has not cited this exclusion
nor argued for its application, and hence it will not be discussed by Pollard. Suffice it to say that theexclusion is also
ambiguous.
There are some notable quotes in the Wagner case.
"We recognize that 'automobile insurance is generally
sold through adhesion contracts that are not negotiated
at arms length', and that '[pjurchasers commonly rely
on the assumption that they are fully covered by the
insurance that they buy'. (Citations omitted.) Where
possible, we attempt to give effect to the reasonable
expectations of the insured party."
"There are circumstances when the reasonable
expectations of the insured may counteract a
clear exclusion in the policy. See State Farm
Mutual Auto Ins. Co., v. Masthaum, 748 P.2d
1042, 1047 (Utah 1987) (Durham, J. , dissen
ting)."
"If the evidence indicai.es that the insurer knew or
should have known of the insured's expectation
or that he created or helped to create this expect
ation, equity weights heavily in favor of holding the
insurer to fulfill the insured's expectation." (Citation
omitted.)
"Third, we must determine whetherWagner's alleged
expectation of coverage was reasonable. Tn most
cases, this criterion will be met if one of the other two
is: the insurer normally should not be presumed to
know of an unreasonable expectation. Conversely, if
the insurer created an expectation, it is probably
reasonable for the insured to hold it'." (Citation
omitted.)
Farmers reliance on Wagner is misplaced. Pollard has met the criteria set forth in Wagner.
The reasonable expectation doctrine compels the conclusion that Pollard is entitled to UM
coverage under the Commercial Policy.
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CONCLUSION
The Summary Judgment granted by the Lower Court to Farmers should be reversed and a
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of Pollard to declare UM coverage in his favor should be
granted. The case should be returned to the District Court for trial on this issues of liability of the
UM driver and Pollards damages.
Respectfully Submitted,
GARRETT & GARRETT,
Edward M. Garrett
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